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UN Peace 
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Trends and a Note 
of Caution 
Arturo C. Sotomayor 
Latin America is an acti\'e participant in United Nations (UN) peace-
keeping operations (PKO). Blue helmets from South and Central America 
are currently deployed in various UN-sponsored missions around the 
world. T his picture contrasts markedly from past decades, when military 
institutions were widely kn own for interYening in domestic affairs via 
coups, rather than fo r promoting human rights and democracy abroad. 
Historically, the region has been a recipient, nO[ an exporter, of foreign 
troops. Throughout the 1990s, peacekeeping (PK) soldiers were deployed 
to pacify Central America and the Andes; to date, Central American and 
Andean blue helmets are pacifying regions w ithin and beyon d the \VI estem 
H emisphere. Hen ce, Latin America has now become an exporter of peace, 
not because inst.1bilitv and violence ha\'e diminished at home, but because 
governments across the region have gradually increased their troop 
commiunent to UN peace efforts. At a time w hen military b udgets in 
North America and Europe are in decline, Latin America's commitment 
to international security appears to be rising. This could signify a new era 
for regional security affairs, w ith Latin American states increasingly 
engaged in world politics and the armed forces exposed to globalizing 
trends. 
This chapter ums raises two questions concerning the impact of ulis 
internation al role on £lIe civ il-military relationship wiulin Latin America: 
What motivating factors explain Latin America's interest in PKO? What 
have been the effects ofthis external strategy on civil- military relations? I 
argue that the increased interest in PK stems directly from Latin America's 
recent experience with democratization, in which civil- militan' factors 
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pla~'ed a crucial role. An emerging consensus in Latin America and the UN 
increasingly promotes PK participation as an efficient policy tool to 
reshape the anned forces by pro\'iding them with a mostly constructive 
role overseas, especially in a post-transition to democracy era. Recently, 
democratically elected statesmen have tlms engaged me military in 
missions abroad to correspond Witll the changing regional security env i-
ronment and to emphasize extemal military doctrines. This has led to a 
strong pattem of regional policy diffusion, in which PK participation has 
expanded as a wave, whereby neighboring states ha\'e adopted similar PK 
deployment patterns. 
Democratization and civil- military imperatives thus provided me initial 
incentives for increased participation in external missions, but they have 
not determined tile outcomes. In fact, wim regards to tile second question, 
I argue mat PK has had mi..xed results, w ith many unintended conse-
quences. Soldiers ha\'e benefited from the expansion of missions with 
increased monetary incentives and benefits, but military attitudes towards 
PKO \'arv substantially from country to country. T hose involved in UN 
. . . . 
missions ha\'e increasingly adjusted their mutual defense policies and coor-
dinated their military efforts, but this has inadvertently generated increased 
military activism in diplomatic affairs. Finally, PK has exposed soldiers to 
positive and negati\'e intemational trends, ranging from increased cooper-
ation Witll NGOs to serious allegations of sexual exploitation and human 
rights abuses in PKO. Hence, PK is a socializing tool, but its effectiveness 
for exposing soldiers to new, constructive, and progressive dynamics is not 
guaranteed. This in turn raises questions about civil-military relations' 
claims that civilian s are more capable of efficiently controlling tlleir armed 
forces when tlley are given missions overseas. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. First, I discuss Latin America's 
increased role in UN peace m issions by focusing on the domestic an d 
regional demands for military action. I tllen analyze tlle unintended conse-
quences of such actions, including me effects on soldiers, regional security 
cooperation, and military orientation. 
Civil-Military Rationales and Neighborhood Effects on latin 
American PK Contributions 
During the Cold \'Qar era, Latin America played a mostl~' tangential role 
in UN PK trends. Few UN blue helmets were from tlle Latin American 
region, and no major UN peace operation ever took place in the Western 
Hemisphere bet\veen 1947 and 1990. Larger South American states, such 
as Brazil and Argentina, provided regular military observers for missions 
in the Middle East (Suez) and Soum Asia (Kashmir), but did little to 
finance or command them. 1 
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Furthermore, the wa\'e of diclatorial and authoritarian regimes that 
spread across the region during 1970s and 1980s increased Latin 
America's isolation from major world trends, including PK. Mililary juntas 
in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, C hile, and Peru (among others) decided 
not to commit troops and eventually withdrew all their mililary observers 
from UN PKO. Even Brazil, Latin America's largest and perhaps most 
influential country in the UN system, reverted towards isolationism during 
the dictatorship era. By 1967, the Brazilian anny abslained from sending 
troops to the UN , mostly to silence international crit icism for a p oor 
human rights record. ' 
Nevertlleless, being a product of its time, PK changed once the Soviet 
Union collapsed and the wave of democratization (or tllird wave, as it is 
often known) swept the region. Since the 1990s, the UN system has 
witnessed a sea of change in its nature and purposes. Troop levels have 
increased considerably and more tllan half of tile top twenty UN troop 
contributors now come from tile Third or developing world. ' 
Interestingly, it is in me p ost-Cold War era that the L1tin American 
region has become more actively engaged in UN PK affairs and is 
increasingly seen as trendsetter in troop recruiunent processes. 
Comparatively speaking, Latin America is not the region with me largest 
troop deployment rate in tile UN system to date; Asia and Africa, as a 
whole, deploy more tllan 70 percent of all UN military personnel in tile 
field , w hile Latin America provides dose to 9 percent of all blue helmets 
(see chart below). But tllese numbers must be put in perspective. SOUtil 
Asia has a fearure that no otller region p ossesses, namely a crit ical mass 
of soldiers, mostl~' infantry men, who can be committed for missions o\'er-
seas. Pakistan , Bangladesh, and India are the top tluee UN 
troop-contributing countries; yet, tlleir con tribution represents only a 
small part of the Army's force at home, w hich, in tile case of India, totals 
close to a million men. \XThat is interesting about Latin America is that in 
spite of these force disparities, some South American sta tes, including 
Urugua~' and Brazil, are already ranked among tile top fifteen troop con-
tributors to UN missions (see Table 7 .2, page 187). In 2000, Latin 
America barely contributed, Wi tll less than 3 percent of all UN troops. In 
less than a decade, it increased its troop contribution by more than eight 
percentage points and it is now the world's third largest regional UN 
troop contributor, after Asia and Africa (see T able 7. 1, overleaf). 
Urugua~' stands out: over 24,335 of the country's soldiers have been 
involved in at least one UN PK mission in tile past two decades. In rela-
tion to its population (less tllan four million people) , tllere is one 
Urugua~'an peacekeeper for every two hundred eighty citizens, making 
Urugua~' the world's largest UN troop contributor per capita. 
Furthermore, tile UN Stabilization M ission in Haiti (MINUST AH) 
has become the testing ground for a joint peacebuilding model, developed 
þÿ M a r e s ,   D a v i d .   D e b a t i n g   C i v i l  M i l i t a r y   R e l a t i o n s   i n   L a t i n   A m e r i c a .   C h i c a g o ,   I L ,   U S A :   S u s s e x   A c a d e m i c   P r e s s ,   2 0 1 4 .   P r o Q u e s t   e b r a r y .   W e b .   1 9   O c t o b e r   2 0 1 5 .
Copyright © 2014. Sussex Academic Press. All rights reserved. 
184 An Increased Role in UN Peace Operations 
by Latin American states, in which troops, development aid, and political 
support are mostIy provided by South American states tIlrough joint 
consultation and regional instirutional mechanisms. Indeed, South 
America contributes 48 percent of all UN troops in Haiti, with Brazil 
commanding tIle overall m ission since 2004. " 
Table 7.1 Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping by Region : 
2000 an d 20 10 
Regi on 2000 2010 
Asia 33.90% 47.60% 
Africa 26.60% 34.10% 
Western Europe 16.60% 7% 
Oceania 10.30% 0.30% 
East Europe 8.50% 2% 
Latin America and Caribbean 2.50% 8.90% 
North America 1.60% 0.10% 
Source: NDefen ce and National and International Community, N in A 
Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(RESDAL: Buenos Aires. 2011). p. 103. 
Here is where tIle connection between c ivil~milit:m' relations and UN 
PK becomes relevant. Latin American states increased tIleir troop commit-
ment overseas while experiencing democratization processes at home. 
E"idence fro m this region locates tIle decision to engage in UN op erations 
within c ivil~military relations, specificall~' viewing it as tIle result of 
doctrinal changes within the armed forces. The increasing trend in Lat in 
America is thus to deploy troops overseas as a means to redesign military 
missions, especially during tIle post-transition to democracy era .' This 
Latin American trend originated from a growing conventional wisdom in 
UN policy c ircles, which argues that PK engagement can help refonn the 
armed forces b~' providing tIlem with extemall~' oriented roles tIlat are 
m ore compatible w ith democratic practices. T he implicit assumption is 
tIlat PK "encourages democratization of the military m indset"· and tIlat it 
provides soldiers with an internation al outIook and new ideas about 
conflict prevention. PK may not onl~' provide extemally supported guar-
antees, but also socialize and persuade " m ilitary leaders tIla t tIle role of the 
military is not to act as an internal police force , but ratIler to protect the 
state from outside forces.'" Ultimatel~', PK participation was introduced 
in Latin Am erica as a mechanism to " m ake young officers more 
cosm opoli tan, less nationalistic, and m ore res istant to calls for militarv 
'salvation ' " ia coup in t imes of crisis ."8 
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This growing trend was first put in place by Argentina, in the early 
1990s, following an international call for troops to help support the UN ~ 
sanctioned blockade against Iraq. The president of Argentina at the time, 
Carlos Saul Menem, who had just pardoned the military and survived a 
coup attempt himself, promptly responded b~' deploying soldiers. The 
move changed the national debate on military affairs, as politicians and 
soldiers shifted tlleir attention from military rebellion and trial pardons [0 
UN missions abroad. Governmental and military motivations explain 
Argentina's sudden engagement in UN affairs. The government tried to 
use UN PK participation as a catalyst for greater international exposure 
and for military reform. According to Deborah Norden, PK offered a 
partial solution to two co-related problems: military insubordination and 
an ill-defined mission foc tile armed forces in tile post-transition to democ-
racy era.' To avert future coups, the l\lenem administration carefully 
drafted a particular group of Army officers and non-commissioned offi-
cers [0 serve in multiple UN peace missions in the Fonner Yugoslavia, 
Cyprus, Iraq- Kuwait, Central America, Cambodia, and Rwanda. 8et\veen 
1992 and 1995, Argentina was ranked among tile world's top ten UN troop 
providers.'" In exchange for their sen' ice abroad, soldiers received 
economic compensation, which included per diems and extra bonuses, 
additional training, and international recognition. 
In 1997, ArgelHina assumed the military command of the UN PK Force 
in Cyprus (UN FICYP) and was eventually granted a major non-NATO 
ally status in recognition foc its large contribution to UN PK." However, 
military deployments overseas gradually decreased amidst a looming 
financ ial crisis that erupted in 200 1-2002. Although Argentina is no longer 
among tile top t\venty UN troop contributors, it still maintains military 
units (roughly six hundred soldiers per montll) in Cyprus and Haiti . 
Argentina was the reg ion's trendsetter, deploying troops to places 
where n o other SOUtil American state had e\'er committed . Soon after-
wards, a diffusion wave was triggered in tile SOUtil American region, 
whereby neighboring states began adopting similar PK patterns to those 
implemented b~' the Menem administration. Following Argentina, 
Urugua~' , which had undergone a transition to democracy in 1984 (only a 
year after its neighbor to tile west), committed its first UN PK battalion in 
1992. Amidst its own democratization process, Urugua~' deplo~'ed more 
tllan 1,200 men to tile UN J\·lission in Cambodia (UNTAC). 12 O ther 
deployments followed suit, including tile UN missions in Angola, 
Mozambique, and Congo. By 2000, PK deployments had been effectively 
institutionalized and rationalized in tile military's organizational ethos. Not 
only did PK become the army's central mission, Witll a quarter of its 
soldiers perfonning several UN functions, it also prov ided tile resources 
and economic benefits to subsidize national defense policies and salaries. 
PK became bureaucratized as tile military deployed not only soldiers, but 
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was also heav ily engaged in providing seryices - such as supplying drink-
able and purified water- for several UN PKO. In absolute terms, Uruguay 
was the eighth largest UN troop contributor between 2000 and 20 10. " It 
was also Latin America's leading supplier of blue helmets. In 2011, 
Uruguay sustained three battalions in two concurrent m issions, deploy ing 
more soldiers than neighboring Argentina and Brazi1. Similar to Argentina, 
PK provided salary incentives, supplementary defense budgets, and suffi-
cient intemational exposure at a t ime when internal missions (such as 
counterinsurgency an d policing) were in decline. 
Brazil was no exception to the rule, and it soon caught up with the PK-
democratization wave that swept across South America. The rerurn to 
ciyilian rule in 1985 brought Brazil back to UN politics. As the country 
democratized, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (also known as Ilamaraly ) 
increased its p resen ce in the intemational organization. Democratization 
has p la~'ed an important role in shaping Brazil's multilateral policy, an d its 
rerum to PK affairs has largely been motivated b~' foreign and domestic 
policy imperatives. In contrast to Argentina an d Uruguay, PK in Brazil has 
been conceived asa mechanism to achieye two related foreign policy goals, 
namely, to increase the country's yisibility in the UN system, after years of 
isolation, and to encourage the internationalization of its polit ical and mili-
tary strategies. 
Unlike Argentina and U ruguay - countries that deployed large military 
units to places far away from national security interests - Brazil took a 
much more gradual approach towards PK. It graduall~' increased its troop 
contribution by sending only a handful of observers to Portuguese-
speaking nations in Africa an d Asia (Mozambique, Angola, and East 
Timor) during the 1990s, and only later contributed with large contingents 
an d units to the UN mission in H aiti. 
Brazil became a leading UN troop contributor after committing more 
than 1,200 troops to stabilize the Caribbean nation of Haiti in 2004. This 
force appeared to be relatively small, but it had an important symbolic 
significance. In the space of six years (2004-2010), m ore than 6,000 
Brazilian soldiers participated in M INUSTAH, making it Brazil's largest 
foreign military commiunent since the UN mission in the Suez in the 1950s 
an d \Vorld \Var II. Also, it is important to note that Brazil was given the 
general military command of a UN peace operation in Haiti, composed of 
roughly 7,000 soldiers and 1,600 police, half of whom came from Latin 
America. l\'\oreover, this was the first time soldiers from the Brazilian 
armed forces were involyed in a mission mandated under chapter seven of 
the UN Charter, which im'olves the authority to use force if necessary, 
about which Itamaraly had previousl~' expressed reseryations. Similarly, 
President Lula was deploy ing forces to take oyer from American an d 
French forces in a Caribbean island that had few or no cultural, linguistic 
or political linkages to Brazi1. ' · 
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Certainly, Brazil has used its PK contribution to publicize its commit~ 
ment to international stability and to demonstrate that the countrv had 
. . 
sufficient leadership skills to be considered a so-called "global player" or 
"emerging power." j , Howeyer, it has also sought to improve intra-bureau~ 
cratic coordination between soldiers and diplomats by fo rcing both 
establishments to work jointly in peacekeeping. Decision makers have tlms 
come to realize tllat if Brazil is to increase its status as a "global player," it 
needs to syn chronize the messages and actiy ities of its yarious bureaucra-
cies, especiall~' its most visible ministries. According to Brazilian experts, 
Brazil's PK strategy is an attempt to gradually expose the anned forces to 
democracy and globalization. ,. Citing a Brazilian geopolitics expert, The 
Economist claims, " Peacekeeping encourages tile democratization of tile 
military mindseL The old generation is all about war and security. In 
another generation we'll haye a new military, Witll an international outlook 
and new ideas about conflict prevention, civ ilian go\"ernment and tile rule 
oflaw."' 7 
Chile, once ruled by a dictator who despised the UN human rights 
regime, also bandwagoned the SOUtll American PK wave, shortly after its 
own gradual and d ifficult transition towards democracy in 1988. H owever, 
tile Chilean military establishment was first resistant to engaging soldiers 
in UN peace operations and rejected im"itations to participate in joint 
missions Witll Argentina during tile early 1990s. It was not until 2000, after 
the house arrest and indictment of General Augusto Pinochet, tllat a new 
generation of senior military officers began to seriousl~' assess and consider 
tile benefits of UN PK participation. '" Similar to Brazil's PK path, C hile 
took a very cautious approach, deploying only a handful of military 
observers to tile UN mission in Cy prus, along with the Argentine contin-
gent, and in Bosnia-HerLegoyina. H owever, under President Michelle 
Bachelet (2004-2008) the country took a more active military role in UN 
operations. The UN Security Council initially autllOrized a three-montll 
J'vlultinational Interim Force in February of 2004 (tile predecessor of 
J'vUNUSTAH ), comprised of US Marines; later, French, Canadian, and 
heavily armed Chilean troops joined the stabilization force. " 
Subsequently, Chilean Ambassador Gabriel Valdes became UN Special 
Representative to Haiti, while the military command of tile mission was 
g iyen to Brazil.20 Chile's military role evolved over time from committing 
troops overseas to deploying soldiers for enforcement (or combat) opera-
tions authorized bv tile UN. Likewise, it took command and control of tile 
strategic Haitian port of Cap-Haitien, w here nearly five hundred Chilean 
soldiers have been stationed since 2005. 21 
The South American PK wave continues to evoh"e as the universe of 
cases keeps increasing, Witll Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru 
committing troops to MINUSTAH. Even former PK recipient states, 
including EI Salyador and Guatemala, are now engaging tlleir pre\"iously 
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Table 7.2 Latin Ameri ca n military contributio ns to UN PKO, 2010 
UN 
Mission Argentina Brazil Uruguay Chile Bolivia Peru Paraguay EI Sa~ador Guatemala Eruador Honduras 
Country 
Western 
Sahara 3 10 1 2 5 12 
Ha it i 709 2308 1128 503 208 m 31 146 67 
li~r i a 4 3 4 3 2 3 
Ivory Coast 7 2 3 3 10 3 5 1 
Congo DRC 141 0 29 7 17 156 
Darfur 2 
Sudan 22 15 13 6 4 8 17 
East Timor 4 
Isr a e~ Pa lestine 5 3 
Lebanon 5) 3 
Nepal 6 2 6 1 
Ind ia ·Pak ista n 2 2 
Afghanistan 1 
Cyprus 266 1 15 2 14 
Tota l ~er 
moot 983 2362 2546 S23 260 401 B9 66 319 88 12 
50urce: These numbers represent monthly average troop contributiom as reported by the UN Oepartment of peacekeePin~ Operatiom. See 
"Oefence and National and International Community~, Comparativr> Atlas of Defence in Latin America and the Caribbean BuenO! Aires: RESOAl 
2011), p. 102. 
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authoritarian armies in UN mISSIOns. Bv the end of 201 0, eleven Latin 
American countries had more than 7,000 soldiers in fourteen UN opera-





Figure 7.1 Centre on International Cooperation, Global Peace 
Operations 2011, p. 109. 
Paradoxicall\", three Latin American states have been notorioush" 
. . 
absent from the PK wave, namelv C uba, .Mexico, and Venezuela. These 
countries are major development aid donors in Haiti, but have yet to 
commit troops to UN operations. Cuba has been traditionally critical of 
PKO, often denouncing them as nothing less than veiled fo rms of imperi-
alistic intervemion." Cuba's position towards PKO, however, is not 
entirel~' different from the policies once held by previous South American 
authoritarian regimes, which often refrained from committing troops to the 
UN. O ne srrand of research on political rationales for contributing to UN 
peace missions argues that democracies are more likel~' to cooperate with 
institutions, such as the UN, and even commit troops fo r PK to assist other 
fa iling democracies from collapsing and in order to establish peace among 
themselves.ll H owever, an alternate hypothesis suggests that military insti-
tutions with prevailing national security doctrines (focused on political 
order and counterinsurgency) will be resistant to commit soldiers in 
support of PK precisely because commanders will have a preoccupation 
( if not an obsession) with national politics and economics, and its rela-
t ionship with national secu rity. In such a com ext, the military d octrine will 
place a premium on civilian opponents and preventing internal disorder 
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and warfare, rather than maintaining peace abroad." Hen ce, Cuba's oppo-
sition to PK might be less motivated by the lack of democracy in the islan d 
and more influenced by the type of national security doctrine practiced by 
the armv itself. 
On me orner hand, the absen ce of J\·1exican troops in UN operations is 
puzzling. Mexico is the world 's tenth largest economic donor to the UN 
regular budget an d Latin America's largest financial prov ider to the UN 
PK budget." Mexican troops number dose t0250,000, the region's largest 
after Brazil. Likewise, me country is a founding member of the UN system 
an d its diplomats have occupied key positions within me organization. Still, 
.\-\exico has yet to commit a single soldier to UN peace efforts and has 
provided police forces to only one UN mission, El Salvador, in 1991. 
Research on .:'v\e.xican ci\' il--military relations suggests mat military imper-
atives and preferences have prevented civilian officials from committing 
troops overseas.'· Specificall~', the army remains vehementl~' opposed to 
deploying soldiers abroad when its organizational imperatives remain 
focused on internal missions. The growing influence of drugs and cartels 
has had an impact on tile armed forces. Increasingly, tile military is being 
used to deter transnational organized crime witllin l'vtexican borders. In 
fact, tllOusands of soldiers were incorporated into the fede ral police force, 
an d P resident Calder6n deployed more titan forty tllOusand troops across 
tile country to fight drug cartels. n The Mexican anny tlms perceives peace 
operations as a diversion and distraction from its main mission (anti-drug 
campaigns), much to tile chagrin of tile diplomatic establishment, which 
would prefer some level of international commitment. Hen ce, doctrinal 
imperatives (a focus on drug trafficking, insurgency, and policing) and the 
armed forces' relative institutional autonom~' help explain .:\1exico's 
dev iant PK behavior. 
F inally , Venezuela's PK policy also deviates from tile regional standard. 
This South American state was once hea\'ily engaged in UN peace oper-
ations in Central America during tile early 1990s, becoming one of the 
region's largest troop-contributing states. T he government of men 
President Carlos Andres Perez provided more tllan two hundred fifty 
peace observers to EI Salvador and a fu ll battalion (nearly eight hundred 
soldiers) to tile UN mission in N icaragua to demobilize 20,000 Contras. 
Under Hugo Chavez, however, Venezuela completel~' witlldrew its peace 
observers from the UN svstem.28 
President Chavez has an acti\'e and controversial foreign policy , but has 
not used military means to achieve political goals abroad. Although he is a 
former anny coronel, he is not known fo r recruiting troops for foreign 
policy campaign s. This stems from a long history of military distrust an d 
lack of political support from some senior members of the armed forces. " 
Chavez himself was a victim of a military coup attempt in 2002, and his 
tluee administrations to date have effectively purged the anny, reduced its 
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force, and created an alternative Bolivarian militia, which is strikingly 
similar to Cuba's Territorial Militia.'" In other words, Venezuela's foreign 
policy has distanced itself from PKO in part because it does not trust the 
anned forces to con duct m issions overseas. T his, again, seems to suggest 
that civilian authorities fac ing political challenges will probably abstain 
from deploying troops or limit their PK commitments in order to focus 
their attention on domestic concerns.JJ Other countries that ha\'e recenth' 
experienced political turmoil and coups, including Honduras and 
Paragua~' , might follow this same path and commit fewer troops to future 
UN missions. 
Therefore, the e\'idence from the Latin American cases suggests a 
correlation between political transitions (democratization or erosion of 
democracy) and PK contributions, in which civ il- military factors ha\'e 
provided incenti\'es as well as disincenti\'es for participation in UN oper-
ations. But what has been the overall effect among those who ha\'e been 
involved in UN missions? PK commitments suggest the presence of 
second image reverse effects, in w hich international factors may affect the 
domestic structures of those states im'olved in international processes." 
PK Participation and its Effects on Civil-Military Relations: A 
Mixed Bag of Results 
\'\Thile Latin America's involvement in UN PKO has received increasing 
atten tion from defense and UN policies communities, there is little 
research available about tile effects of peace operations on civ il- military 
relations. Nevertheless, the preliminary ev idence from case studies indi-
cates tlmt such international engagements have had mixed results." T hree 
issue areas deserve analysis, namely, the effects on soldiers, regional coop-
eration, and mission orientation. 
First, studies conducted on Argentine civil- military relations have 
demonstrated that participation in PK had an overall positive effect among 
military officers, especially at a t ime when public opinion towards tile 
anned forces was at its historic low and when militan' discontent towards 
political leadership was at its highest. 14 PK diffused military discontent in 
Argentina after a tumultuous transition to democracy , in which tile 
number of officers prosecuted by Argentine courts for human rights abuse 
represented abou t 20 percent of the country's active officer corps." In tllis 
context, participation in UN operations prov ided monetary incentives for 
soldiers and, more importantly, a constructive role to engage a young 
cohort of officers who felt increasingly alienated from the political system. 
Interestingly , a sun'ey among 6,607 army officers, conducted a decade 
after the first UN deployment, found that 45 percent of all tllose inter-
viewed indicated that forming part of a PK mission was a priority for tile 
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armed forces; 39 percent perceived such missions as important but not 
primary; and only 15 percelH considered PK as an unimportant mission 
for the force; one percent expressed no opinion.'· During the l' ... 1enem 
administration, dose to 40 percent of the army officer corps participated 
in at least one PK mission; hence, a large percentage of arm~' soldiers were 
exposed to international missions during a key transitional period in 
Argentina. U ltimately, this e.xperience contributed to internationalize the 
officer corps and reduced the incentives for future military rebellion. 
However, the Argentine experience was not replicated elsewhere in the 
region. In contrast to Argentina, Venezuela's experience with UN peace 
missions in Central America generated wide military discontent, as such 
operations were broadl~' perceived as d iversionary strategies designed by 
civilian s to distract the attention of the armed forces. For instance, Carlos 
A. Romero found that Venezuelan soldiers who participated in the peace 
operation in Nicaragua (ONUCA) became increasingly discontented with 
the mission and blamed their own political leadership fo r the UN failures. 
In fact, PK deteriorated ci\'il-military relations, especiall~' when many 
arm~' officers were already unhappy with the wa~' President Perez was 
managing political affai rs in Venezuela (all while assuming a political lead-
ership role abroad). Romero then found that many of the soldiers who had 
participated in the anny's uprising and coup attempt of 1992, led b y Hugo 
C havez, had in fact just returned from PK assignments in Honduras and 
Nicaragua." In this case, PK did not make young officers more 
cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, or less resistant to coups in t imes of crisis. 
These extreme results suggest variation in PK outcomes and raise ques-
tions about the alleged positive impact of international facto rs on 
ciyil- militan' relations. 
Second, l"UNUSTAH has generated increased interest in regional 
secu rity cooperation in South America. Although the region is st ill far from 
the security community model developed in Europe, there is substantial 
e\'idence of increased regional policy coordination. Certainly, this is not 
the first time we have witnessed Latin American solidarity and coopera-
tion in PK issues. The pacification of Central America in the 1990s and 
the Ecuador-Peru reconciliation effort of 1998 generated plenty of regional 
coordination efforts inyolving regional powers (Argentina, Brazil, 
Venezuela, and l' ... 1exico), organizations, ad hoc groups (the Contadora 
group, Esquipulas process, and the Rio Group), as well as troop commit-
ments from a varie~' of Latin American countries. '" H owever, diplomatic 
agents mostly led the peace processes in C entral America and Ecuador-
Peru. Converseh', the UN mission in Haiti involves the armed forces as the 
principal agent, in which tile military is largely responsible for the success 
and failure ofthe mission . 
For instance, PK has enabled tile Argentine and Chilean armed forces 
to identifv common interests. Their involvement in Haiti eyentuallv led to 
, , 
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the creation of the Argentine-C hilean b i-national force for peace opera-
tion s, known as Cruz del Sur (Southern Cross). In this framework, two 
fonne r regional military foes now conduct joint t raining exercises for PKO. 
According to Rut Diamint, "C ruz del Sur . .. opened the prospect of 
further defense cooperation and helped to definitely end mutual conflict 
scenarios .. . Argentina and C hile' s contribution was not seen as a selfless 
service to global peace, but as an unexpected and inexplicable initiative by 
two countries that had hitherto played antagonist roles within the D PKO 
[UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations]."" As a result, C hilean 
military officers are now embedded within the Argentine contingent in the 
UN mission in Cy prus, while blue helmets from Argentina are incorpo-
rated into C hile 's PK unit in Bosn ia-Heri:egovina. Other similar 
experiences have been replicated across the region. In fact, Paraguayan 
troops are trained by and embedded with Brazilian peacekeepers in Port-
au-Prince. 
Furthermore, the PK experience in Haiti motivated South American 
leaders to find means to better coordinate their joint milium' efforts in the 
Caribbean. Argentina, Brazil and C hile, or ABC, as they are sometimes re-
ferred to, informall~' coordinated me military aspects of AH NUSTAH. 
Eventually, the group was formalized into the 2x3 coordination mecha-
nism, which regularly gathers two deputy ministries (foreign affairs and de-
fense) from its three member states (2 xABC = 2 x3). Since 2004, the ABC 
has expanded into the ABC+U (U for Urugua~' ) and the so-called 2 x 9 
(ABC+ Boli\'ia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay).-\{} 
The emerging policy convergence and defense coordination amongst 
South American peacekeepers hm'e led scholars to believe that the region 
has now become an exporter of peace, which in part reflects upon meir very 
own national experience with dictatorships and democracy." 
Similarly , there has been a proliferation of PK training centers, w hereby 
almost every Latin American country involved in peace operations has 
now established a fonnal structure to prepare and train blue helmets. This 
has also increased military contacts leading to the creation of me Latin 
American Association of PK Training Centers (ALCOPAZ), which 
includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Paragua~' , Peru, and Uruguay. Through this mechanism, Latin American 
soldiers meet every six months to exchange knowledge, lessons learned, 
and discuss how to better prepare peacekeepers for missions such as 
lvllNUSTAH. Recently, Argentina was selected by the UN DPKO to 
develop a nationwide pilot plan to prepare and train the first cadre of 
female UN fo rce commanders . ., 
The unusual high levels of military cooperation eventually led Brazil 
to convene the defense ministers of the region to a meeting in Brasilia in 
2008 to create the Defense Council of the U n ion of South American 
Nations (UNASUR). The Council included me nine South American 
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states involved in .\UNUSTAH and had the explicit purpose of strength-
ening regional defense and military cooperation.~) Many saw this as a 
Brazilian attempt to establish a successor instirution for the lnter-
American system and a means to exclude \'1ashington from the regional 
decision-making process. Jose .:'v\iguel lnsulza, the Chilean Secretary 
General of the Organization of American States (OAS), even declared 
that it was "completel~' wrong" that the GAS had been excluded from the 
dialogue.44 Together, these initiatives instituted what might be tenned as 
military diplomacy in South America, in which international security 
coordination efforts were put in place by the region 's defense and mili-
tan' establishments. 
\'\lithout a doubt, these joint ventures have fostered regional military 
cooperation; however, it is unclear whether they have improved civil-mili-
tary relations. \'\lith the mere exception of Argentina (the only country that 
has effectivel~' civ ilianized its defense establishment), PK has evolved into 
an essentially military enterprise. South America's contribution to peace 
operations is almost exclusively composed of troops and military 
observers; the region provides very limited support with UN police and 
civilian personnel. .:'v10reover, as Rut Diamint argues in her chapter contri-
bution to this book, in most South American countries, the process of 
recruitment, training, doctrine, and decision making is often delegated to 
selyice commanders (mostly the army), who in rum implement policies 
with relative institutional autonomy. The defense ministries, which are 
staffed mostly by military personnel, act as mere political managers and 
logistical administrators of PK policies, Witll no relevant policy leverage on 
educational, training, or doctrinal matters.·' 
C ivilian input in the decision making process is marginal at best, often 
led by the executive branches, in direct consultation Witll military service 
commanders. Legislators play a secondary role in autllorizing troop 
deployments and remain mostly uninfonned about current PK trends."'" 
Again, with tile exception of Argentina, peace missions have neitller altered 
tile balance between military agents and ci\'ilian principals, nor have tlley 
increased civilian leverage over defense matters .• \-10reover, PK has actu-
allv increased the so-called "civilian attention deficit"·' as active military 
. . 
officers are, de facto, the only field specialists on peace support operations. 
C ivilian experts on peacebuilding are scarce or affiliated to military insti-
tutions. Not surprisingly, few academic civilian institutions in Latin 
America offer specialized courses on peacebuilding or humanitarian oper-
ations. By contrast, military academies across Latin America organize 
conferences and seminars on peace missions, while their PK training 
centers cater to journalists and even graduate srudents w ith specialized 
courses and certificate programs on UN peace operations ..... 
Although an increased number of women have been involved in UN 
missions, a recent report by RESDAL indicated that Latin America's 
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participation in PK continues to be a predominantly male-dominated 
endeavor.4' This in spite of the fact that fonner Chilean President Michelle 
Bachelet was recentl~' appointed as tlle \'{fomen Executive Director for tlle 
UN system, who is directly responsible for monitoring and improving 
gender relations in UN -sponsored peace operations. 
Furthermore, PK has become a niche for military entrepreneurship, in 
which officers deployed to UN missions can more tllan double their regular 
salaries, military sen' ices find ways to increase military budgets to supple-
ment PK operational costs, and defense establishments use UN operations 
to sell training modules or provide sen'ices to tlle UN system at market 
value. '" In sum, and as Diamint argues in her chapter contribution, PK has 
effectively increased military activism Witllout generating improved 
civilian inten'ention. 
Finally, the eviden ce regarding the positive effects of PK on military 
missions remains largely disputable. This is ironic, since so much scholar-
ship on civil-military relations claims that civ ilians are more capable of 
controlling tlleir armed forces when tlley are given missions overseas. An 
externally oriented military mission supposedl~' enables ci\'ilians to control 
and manage domestic politics more effectively Witllout having to face tlle 
challenge of military inten'ention or insubordination. In a critical review 
of tlle civil-military relations literature, David Pion-Berlin and Craig 
Arceneaux summarized the external-oriented mission argument as 
follows: " As tlle military prepares professionally to face external chal-
lenges, it is increasingly preoccupied with matters strictl~, of a defensive 
nature, and thus lured away from domestic politics."" It therefore makes 
sense for civ ilian leaders to emphasize externally oriented missions. After 
all, tlle main reason so many Latin American states got involved in UN PK 
in the early 1990s was to redefine military missions in a post-transition to 
democraC'" era. Have militan' missions been transformed amidst increased 
. . 
levels of PK participation? 
Certainly, tlle armed forces of Latin America are now more readily 
engaged in external missions. H owever, PK remains in a secondary or 
tertiary role compared to other domestic missions, including policing, drug 
trafficking, counterinsurgency, or managing civilian unrest. Uruguay is tlle 
only country where UN peace operations absorb almost a quarter of tlle 
force and in which PK is tile main military mission. UN troop commit-
ment le\'els remain notoriousl~' low in the rest of Latin America, Witll only 
a handful of military obsen'ers and units deployed to UN operations, 
mostly in Haiti. Brazil and Chile, tlle t'.vo military-powerful SOUtll 
American states currentl~' engaged in l\lINUSTAH , deploy less tllan one 
percent of their overall military force to peace operations. \'{fitll a total force 
of almost 300,000 and 60,000 soldiers respectively, these regional military 
powers could easily deploy far more troops tllan they have actually 
committed . At best, military institutions across the region have merely 
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added PK to the menu of missions they perform without fundamentall~' 
modifying their structure or modus operandi. 
\Vhat impact has PK generated among the one percent involved in UN 
missions? According to the conventional thinking, PK can be a powerful 
agent of socialization that can potentially modify military preferences by 
socializing the rank and file of officers to specific norms of conduct one 
soldier at a t ime." Interestingly, Latin American troops in Haiti appear to 
be performing roles that look quite similar to those performed at home. As 
explained in Rut Diamint's chapter, the Brazilian blue helmets have been 
policing and controlling drug gangs in Port-au-Prince, using similar skills 
an d tools as those conducted in the lave/as of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 
where anti-gang and anti-drug trafficking campaigns are common." 
Similarly, Urugua~'an naval units are assisting Haitian authorities in deter-
ring drug trafficking near Jacmel and Port-Salut, w here drug shipments 
usually enter the countn' to be later d istributed into the D ominican 
. . 
Republic, Puerto Rico, and Miami.'~ Peacekeeping thus appears to repli-
cate domestic scenarios, placing troops III similar operational 
env ironments, but under the UN flag and authority. 
H ave the results been different under the UN flag? O nce again, 
e\'idence from Haiti suggests that PK has not fundamentally altered 
behavior or outcomes. Reports from international NGOsand lawyers have 
continuousl~' denounced Brazil's pacification strategy, which relies heavily 
on the use of force and causes collateral damage. The Han 'ard Law 
Student Advocates for H uman Rights and the Centro deJ/lSlifa Global (in 
Brazil) conducted one of the most comprehensive evaluations of the UN 
mission in H aiti in 2005, also known as the " H an'ard Report." In its find-
ings, the report con cluded, "Despite on e of the strongest human rights 
mandates in the history of UN PKO, MINUSTAH has n ot effectivel~' 
investigated or reported human rights abuses; nor has it protected human 
rights advocates. C harged to train and reform the Haitian National Police, 
.\UNUSTAH instead has provided unquestioning support to p olice o per-
ations that have resulted in warrantless arrests and detention s, unintended 
civilian casualties and deliberate extrajudicial killings .. . In consequence, 
Haiti is ruled b y guns and terror, not law" ." 
Furtllennore, in 20 11 , a PK scandal erupted, this time involving 
Uruguayan blue helmets. Specifically, five Uruguayan peacekeepers in 
Haiti were accused of sexual abuse and assault on a teenage boy. The case 
originated a crisis in Urugua~' and Haiti , forcing President Jose l\'\ujica, 
himself a \'ictim of torture during me Uruguayan dictatorship, to publi-
cally apologize to the Haitian people.'· The scandal prompted U ruguayan 
authorities to dismiss the navy 's mission commander, while the five sailors 
accused of alleged sexual assault were withdrawn from the mission, 
decommissioned, and then put under military justice. This incident took 
place in a context in which UN peacekeepers had been consistentlv 
þÿ M a r e s ,   D a v i d .   D e b a t i n g   C i v i l  M i l i t a r y   R e l a t i o n s   i n   L a t i n   A m e r i c a .   C h i c a g o ,   I L ,   U S A :   S u s s e x   A c a d e m i c   P r e s s ,   2 0 1 4 .   P r o Q u e s t   e b r a r y .   W e b .   1 9   O c t o b e r   2 0 1 5 .
Copyright © 2014. Sussex Academic Press. All rights reserved. 
Arturo C. Sotomayor 197 
accused of sexual abuse in Haiti. In 2007, some one hundred Sri Lankan 
blue helmets - 10 percent of an entire brigade - were repatriated because 
they were giving small amoun ts of cash , food, and sometimes mobile 
phones in exchange for se.x with underage girls." The Uruguayan in cident 
thus confirmed the belief that a culture of institutional impunity, which 
tolerated sexual abuse, had developed within the UN mission. 
U ltimately, these incidents indicate that accountability, t ransparency, 
and even civ ilian control are inherently weak, even w hen rroops are 
perfonning UN-mandated peace operations. This certainl~' problematizes 
and complicates the relationship bet\veen e.xternal missions and ci\'ilian 
control O\'er the anned forces. The relationship is no longer linear, progres-
sive, or positive. 
Conclusions 
The preliminary findings of tllis research raise questions about conven-
tional wisdom in civil-military relations concerning tlle effects of externally 
oriented missions on civilian control. The cases explored here suggest that 
civilians can lose control O\'er the anned forces when they perfonn external 
roles, such as PK, as much as w hen they perform domestic or internal roles. 
Therefore, tllis project corroborates the insights of David Pion-Berlin and 
Craig Arceneaux regarding tlle role of civilians in crafting missions; as tlley 
argue, the key difference is not the type of mission being performed, but 
how the mission is defined, shaped, an d monitored by civ ilian agents.5>i In 
the Latin American cases, tllere is onlv scarce evidence of increased ci\'ilian 
interyention in PK policies. 
Yet, this chapter has only scratched the surface of a complex but fasci -
nating area of research; several issues remain unexplained and merit fuller 
analysis in the fu ture. For instance, tlle PK policy diffusion wave expanded 
across tlle region, but the effects have varied substantiall~' from country to 
country. Latin American states involved in seemingly similar peace oper-
ations differed considerably in tlle way tlley managed their civil- military 
relations. This variation in outcomes is intriguing and requires funher 
research . It suggests the presence of domestic interyening variables that 
diffuse the effects of external factors, leading to divergent effects among 
states. Hence, future research needs to explore tlle d omestic causes of tllis 
variation. 
Similarly, research on PK has often assumed that all peace operations 
are comparable, invoh'ing similar mandates, tasks, and duties. In the field, 
however, tlle operations conducted by the UN are evidentl~' d ifferent and 
disperse from each other. Not surprisingly, tile UN has a mixed record of 
success in accomplishing its PK, peacebuilding, an d peace-enforcement 
goals. Again, this variation in outcomes could ha\'e large consequences on 
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ciyil- military relations, in w hich soldiers exposed to failed missions may in 
fact adop t illiberal and regressive norms and practices, leading to n egative 
socialization . T he relationship between different types of UN missions an d 
ciyil- militan' relations should be more thoroughly and systematicall~' 
explored as well. 
Finally, analysts may need to look beyond the UN and the Latin 
American region to have a more comprehensive picture of how external 
missions affect civil-military relations. This entails comparisons between 
different types of intemational security organizations conducting PK -
U N, NATO, EO, EC O\'1AS and African Union - and more cross-regional 
comparati\"e anal~'si s . If South Asia and Africa are the maj or contrib utors 
to PK, then how do the armed forces of these countries react when the\' 
are deployed overseas? How similar or different is their experience 
compared to Latin America? H as PK had any effect on coup predisposi-
tion? Again, a comparative analysis among countries with similar PK 
experiences might shed light on competing explanations. 
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